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Abstract— While worms and their propagation have been a
major security threat over the past years, causing major financial
losses and down times for many enterprises connected to the
Internet, we will argue in this paper that valuable lessons can
be learned from them and that network management, which is
the activity supposed to prevent them, can actually benefit from
their use. We focus on five lessons learned from current malware
that can benefit to the network management community. For
each topic, we analyse how it is been addressed in standard
management frameworks, we identify their limits and describe
how current malware already provides efficient solutions to
these limits. We illustrate our claim through a case study on a
realistic application of worm based network management, which
is currently developed in our group.
I. INTRODUCTION
Integrated network and service management is the main
component in a network allowing to operate a network and
provide value added services with respect to contracted service
levels. Network management activities are divided in five
main functional areas (FCAPS) related to fault management,
configuration, accounting tasks, performance and security mo-
nitoring. Management operations are performed within an
administrative domain. From an historical perspective, an
administrative domain is well delimited both by contractual
and operational measures. In the new and rapidly evolving
Internet, these limits become blurred. End users purchase
devices and services requiring at least partial management
from a third party. Multi provider service gateways become a
reality and new management paradigms must emerge in order
to cope with these challenges. There are multiple challenges
that must be addressed. Managing a large scale infrastructure
is probably among the first and major issues. Evolving towards
a management plane capable to deal with millions of devices,
spread over the whole Internet and accessible through firewalls
and network address translation devices, is the main driving
direction of research in network and service management. We
argue that the ingredients for the future management plane
are already being developed, although in a community that
has not always the best intentions. The creators of malware
and worms had been confronted from the early days with large
scale infrastructures operated in hostile environments. We will
highlight in the following the main features in current malware
that we consider essential building blocks for managing the
future Internet.
Our paper is structured as follows. The five main challenges
that network management must face are presented in individual
sections. Each section concludes with conceptual solutions ins-
pired from current existing malware. Section II addresses the
issue of large scale network management. Next, we consider
the cases of multi-vendor and heterogeneous equipment which
is the subject of section III. Three essential building blocks for
any network management plane are given by its ability to be
flexible, adaptive and to operate reliable and securely. These
issues are addressed in the sections IV, V and respectively VI.
A case study of a large scale distributed honeypot is described
in section VII, where a malware based management is the only
viable approach. Finally, we conclude the paper and highlight
future works in section VIII.
II. LARGE SCALE DEVICE MANAGEMENT
A. Scale processing in the standard management approaches
Scale has always been a concern in the device, network
and service management community and various proposals to
deal with it have been made over the last twenty years. In
the early stages of management standardization, namely late
80’s, management framework designers did address the scale
issue by extending the simple albeit efficient manager/agent
model to a centralized hierarchical model where managers
could be cascaded to deal each with a subset of the managed
environment, thus applying a divide and conquer method.
For example, some commercial OSI management platforms
did provide a smart name-based routing scheme enabling
management requests to travel to their destination agent trough
a tree of managers. While this approach has been proven
efficient in some contexts, it did also show its limits ; typically
in the domain of fault-management and event correlation
where the routing of events among a big tree of management
nodes caused long delays in their processing.
A major step forward in the evolution of management
architectures came through the proposal of management by
delegation [1]. This model went beyond a tree of managers
by proposing (and enabling) processing to be dynamically
assigned to management agents themselves. This model has
been instantiated over the years in many ways and efforts were
undertaken within IETF to provide a standard support for such
a delegation as part of the DISMAN initiative which has led
to some RFCs on delegation and remote operations [2].
The pressure of scale in the management plane has again
increased in the last five years for two reasons. First, new net-
work infrastructures and services push the scale requirements
on management to never imagined levels beyond millons of
devices. This applies for example to dynamic update (e.g.
patch distribution) of many millions of hosts [3], configu-
ration and monitoring of several millions of cable modems
and services in the home by a single operator, management
of large P2P communities [4]. Second, management cannot
live anymore in a world, where resources can be considered
infinite. While the benchmarking activity has seen a good
evolution in the community, really large scale issues have not
been addressed in a satisfactory manner. In fact, researchers of
the management community did mainly focus their work on
management integration enabling new network domains to be
remotely managed (e.g. by making home networks managed
by UPnP visible over TR-69 protocols in the provider domain
through gateways), but these efforts are far from complete.
For example, manual configuration is very often required on
any single device to make it manageable and interference
among services in many networks remains a problem for
the management plane. In fact most standard management
protocols simply do not work in most networks where firewalls
and NATs are in place.
B. Malware and large scale management
It is known that botnets (network of compromised machines)
under the sole control of one malicious user can range well
into hundreds of thousands if not even millions of devices.
A well documented case [5] is more that illustrative. One
person was charged with having compromised more than
400.000 machines, installing malware and allowing third party
spammers to use them as relay servers. Spammers could use
this on-demand infrastructure over a delimited time frame
and billing was done online. It is more than surprising to
discover that 1) managing a large scale of bots is possible,
2) allowing partial third party control to this infrastructure
(in network management terms, we would call it CNM :
customer network management) is possible and that 3) billing
and accounting have been also well addressed. It is true that
the functionalities of the network were limited to only a limited
set of well defined operations, but nevertheless even these
primitive management operations are good examples for the
viability of such an approach. The idea of using malware type
of techniques (see figure 1) for doing benefic activities is
not new. In fact, the "ethical worm" [6] did already attack
machines that were infected by the Code Red worm and
removed the latter. The Code Green worm attacked infected
machines using the same exploit code and thus provided for a
first real world example of worm based management platform.
A similar case is given by the Dabber and Gaobot.AJS which
perform direct attacks against the Sasser worm. We will not
discuss further the legal and ethical implications of managing
equipment belonging to another administrative domain but
it’s worth to note that this real world experiment showed
the viability of such management, although it used only the
propagation features of worms. We argue that such approaches
extended with administrative domain bounded propagation and
additional middleware are the ingredients for highly efficient
network management bricks. A promising early work on
benefic (nematodes) controlled worms is described in [7].
Fig. 1. The Antiworm
III. HETEROGENEOUS MULTI-VENDOR EQUIPMENT
A. Standard network management protocols
The goal to manage in an integrated way, heterogeneous
devices and services was (and still is) the “raison d’etre”
of standardization in the management plane. Undertaken in
the late 80’s, standardization of the management plane was
initially driven by ISO and ITU which defined the founda-
tions of Integrated Network and Service Management : the
Manager/Agent model, the functional areas, the concept of
device independent information model and the standard service
and protocol to remotely access management information. This
model was very ambitious, but complex, resource consuming
and often ambiguous and hardly usable despite the large
industrial support to instantiate the standard through industrial
experience and tuning (as done in the Network Management
Forum for example). While today many parts of the OSI
management model remain in most management approaches,
its information modeling approach and language together with
its service and protocol have vanished. In fact, they still remain
operational in many telecommunication networks but are not
deployed in any new infrastructure. Following the ISO efforts,
other bodies did initiate their own management standardization
activities. The first one was of course IETF which came out
with the SNMP (initially designed as a transition technology
before the full support and deployment of OSI-based manage-
ment technologies ...). More recently, DMTF, Oasis-Open and
many other technology groups (3GPP, ATM Forum, ....) did
publish their own management frameworks dedicated to the
services they address.
There is no doubt that standardization has been of great
value to establish common foundations and models for device,
network and service management. History however tells us
that the goal to build a generic widely accepted management
model applicable to universal domains has clearly failed.
In fact, even in a single standardization body, one finds
several management standards, although designed for specific
functions, often featuring services that compete with others.
A typical example can be found in IETF with Netconf, the
various COPS and SNMP. A second element that confirms the
failure of standardization to handle heterogeneity is the success
of proprietary non-standardized solutions provided by vendors
(e.g. CLI, ad-hoc protocols & frameworks like Webmin) or
even private branches of standardized approaches (most MIB
information available today are proprietary data not standar-
dized in an information model). The inability of management
standards to cope with the reality of the networks that evolve
very fast is increasing every day. A simple, albeit strong,
reason is the increasing delays that management evolutions
face in standardization bodies. Even if not encouraged by the
various standardization bodies, today standards emerge long
after the protocol/service they are supposed to manage and
evolutions of existing management standards take a very long
time (if not eternity).
The more we progress, the less management standards are
used and usable to solve the heterogeneity problem of ma-
naged devices. Standard management is not existent anymore
and if available, not operational in many networks that need
management on a large scale. The time has come to find
alternatives.
B. Malware and cross-system integration
In the world of malware, dealing with multiple types of
systems and access mechanisms did not really seem to be a
major problem. Worms like described in [9] are capable to
spread using at least two very different operating systems.
These type of malware are exploiting known vulnerabilities
on these systems and during their propagation, an accurate
remote fingerprinting capability allows to attack a target with
the matching exploit code. An exploit code will typically inject
a shellcode in the process space of a vulnerable application.
The shellcode represents in most cases machine code that
can be directed executed on the targeted machine. Although
this machine code is highly specific to a target machine
architecture, recent advances in shellcode generation moved
towards multisystem shellcode [10] capable to be executed on
different platforms.
The lesson is that a promising approach for managing
multivendor and heterogenous systems, might be to shift
from addressing the integration at the agent side, towards
flexible management proxies able to interact with various
agent endpoints. If we consider the relative long timeframe
required to standardize a network management protocol, such
an approach might prove efficient on both the short and long
term.
IV. DYNAMIC MANAGEMENT PLANE
A. Dynamic Delegation
The need to offer the ability to dynamically change the
behavior of a management entity (either the manager or
the agent) was recognized very early in the management
community and has led to a full range of investigations
and innovations over the last decade. Dynamics was first
introduced in the concept of delegation in the mid 90s [1].
This model did extend existing scripted agent approaches with
elastic servers for management enabling any type of delegation
code to be shipped to and run by remote management agents.
Active networks [11] represent the ultimate approach for
dynamic network management. The basic approach is similar
to the delegation approach of Yemini but the active network
model links more strongly the network activity to the code
of its management. The model supports various dynamicity
levels for delegation of management code (from an external
pre-provisioning of management code on the devices to a per
packet level management code deployment) and has led to
interesting proposals in the area of fully distributed cooperative
management where several management packets with different
capabilities are cruising in the network calling in specific
support (i.e. other packets transporting specific management
code) on the discovery of specific events (e.g. a long lasting
congestion, an identified DDOS, ...) [12], [13], [14].
While active networking for management was a promising
approach, it failed to gain any acceptance for many reasons.
First its focus on the network plane did limit its potential
deployment in the dedicated network devices which are often
closed devices with no capability for hosting external code
for local processing. The second reason for the low impact
of active networks so far is the lack of security of the
infrastructure and the difficulty for administrators to maintain
the management plane under control.
B. Artificial Life and worms
While active networking technology promised seamless
deployment of new applications and functional extension of
already existing software frameworks, its real world deploy-
ment and effective usage remained more than modest. Network
operators did not endorsed this concept and the lack of a
standardized software interface and application programming
interface did limit the usefulness of these approaches. One of
the major problems that was not solved by the work done in
this area was the identification of a real "killer application that
would otherwise not be possible.
In the field of Artificial Intelligence, a major wave of
research activities were driven in the late 80’s by the notion
of genetic programming [15] and artificial life [16]. The
major idea behind these concepts was to build self replicating
programs capable to drive the evolution of an initial population
towards better and more performant future generations. Simu-
lating a Darwinian type of evolution, a computer program was
considered to be an individual and genetic operations between
two individuals allowed to generate new offsprings bearing
the most important and relevant functionalities. Most of the
approaches in these works considered that a computer program
is represented under a tree type of structure and that such tree
structures can be combined and evolved towards better and
more suitable code structures. Unfortunately, in real world
scenarios, combining code structures without addressing the
semantics and without using domain specific knowledge does
seldom lead to something meaningful. Most of the evolved
code structures are not fit and capable to provide reliable and
functional programs. On the other hand, internet worms show
that active technology, or at least some of its components
existed before and survived the works done by the active
networking community. The major illustrative example is the
online combination of a worm with a virus (see figure 2) as
described in [9]. The Cholera worm and the CTX virus use
the same files for hiding and propagating. When the CTX
virus infected machine is next infected with the Cholera worm,
a new creature is born combining functionalities from both
malwares and having more propagation capabilities.
Fig. 2. Artificial Life in malware
What should we learn from this case study ? The lesson
learned with the application of active network technologies
in the management plane is that autonomy for management
functions is interesting and in some cases useful but that
at any point in time, centralized control must be offered.
Also, deployment models that do not rely on the standard
fixed, pre-configured manager/agent paradigm are promising
but need to be refined and evaluated in several large scale
management scenarios. Techniques coming from the artificial
life community could be very interesting for having evolving
and adaptive management functionalities. The important issue
that we must deal with it to define the right code granularity.
Unlike to the traditional artificial life approaches where a very
fine granularity (at instruction level) is used to represent each
evolving creature, we should use a higher level granularity (at
file level or sub-parts of a file) and allow combinations and the
generation of new offsprings from these artificial creatures.
V. RELIABLE MIDDLEWARE
A. The dedicated management network
Standard management makes a couple of assumptions
among which the fact that the management channel is fixed
and operational. In several telecommunication networks, the
management plane is supported by a dedicated physical net-
work on which both managers and agents interact over a
reliable infrastructure and middleware. The most used midd-
leware for supporting management applications, i.e. the midd-
leware used to bind all the applications of a management plat-
form has without doubt been Corba combined with messaging
systems. Today this middleware is slowly being replaced by
web services.
In most emerging networks the provisioning of a dedicated
network solely for management purpose is not feasible any-
more. A good example is the wireless world were management
data is shipped to and from the devices over the same channels
as application payload (e.g. shipping management commands
to a cell phone is often done over SMS). Moreover the advent
of new large scale distributed services like P2P systems offer
an alternative to dedicated large and complex management
centers, enabling the management activity to be spread among
a community providing sufficient assurance on the availability
and the quality for the offered service.
B. Worms IRC and P2P
There are two notable examples of worms using state of
the art supporting middleware. The first one is the case of
the Slapper worm [17]. The second notable illustration is
given by a large category of worms using the IRC protocol
(see figure 3 for an example of the Tendoolf worm) as the
supporting service. The key components of an IRC network are
clients, servers and channels. A client will join a channel on
a particular server. A channel is supported by multiple servers
and these servers are responsible to relay messages among the
multiple clients. These IRC servers build an overlay network
which behaves like an application level spanning tree.
A client connecting to a server will directly communicate
with this one, but all messages sent to a channel will be relayed
among all the servers. A channel can be conceptually seen
as the equivalent of a multicast group. A server will receive
messages on a given channel if and only if it supports clients
on that channel. It is considered in [18] that this approach does
not scale well for two main reasons :
1) Network congestion might cause a link connecting two
servers to fail,
2) additional state information about the channels and
clients is required to be supported by the servers.
These arguments are sound but as of today, the IRC provided
a sufficient scalable solutions for large scale communication
Fig. 3. IRC based worms
among infected zombies and their master. The key architec-
tural design behind the worms using IRC is the use of a
publish subscribe communication system. IRC Servers keep
channels allowing only to publishers to talk. These publishers
can be both infected machines or the zombie master. Infected
machines will typically post multiple types of information :
the IP address, details about the configuration and the ope-
rating system as well as replies to requests coming from
the zombie master. The zombie master posts requests (these
can be commands to continue the infection and propagation),
perform denial of service attacks, or to stop the propagation
and perform a collective suicide [6]. In the same time, clients
will listen on a channel, wait for events and act if required
to. An even more advanced middleware is embedded in the
Slapper worm (see figure 4). The Slapper worm [17] builds an
overlay network capable to provide advanced features among
which, the most notable are :
– Reliable end to end message delivery using the overlay
network. Each node in the P2P network implements a
simple and efficient message delivery process allowing
retransmissions and probabilistic routings. A node that
has to forward a message to another node, will randomly
select a neighboor to which the message will be forwar-
ded. A timeout mechanism will assure the retransmission
and an additional message tracking will assure that no
routing loops are generated.
– Coping with network partitions and reshaping. Firewalls
and system security management might lead to network
partitions or machines that are taken out from the bot
network. The P2P middleware of the Slapper worm is
capable to adapt to such events, respawn a new ovrequi-
redetwork (if requird) and maintain the logical topology
of the network.
– Anonymous message delivery. One of the key features
that Slapper implements is that application level routing
allows to one node to communicate with another node
such that their identity (IP addresses) remain anonymous.
This is implemented by the probabilistic routing mecha-
nism. This hinders any effort to identify the endpoints of
a communication. From a conceptual point of view, this
scheme is equivalent to a simplified onion routing [19]
scheme.
The lesson that network management should learn from
these architectures is that the classical client server interaction
between a manager and an agent has to evolve towards either
a novel peer to peer based management framework or a native
publish subscribe one. Such a scheme is better suited for
intermittent network connectivity and allows a high degree
of privacy for network management.
Fig. 4. P2P based worms
VI. SECURITY AND CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
A. Security in the management plane
At times where a dedicated network was in place which
carried all the management traffic and was unaccessible to any
intruders, security was physically enforced. When manage-
ment traffic started to be mixed in application traffic, security
suddenly became important to network administrators (who
discovered that the community string sent in clear text over
the wire was a real threat towards the management plane). The
advent of secure protocols like SNMPv3 in the management
plane unfortunately did not solve the security problem in the
management plane as it should have, mainly for three reasons.
First very few administrators did move from an unsafe version
of SNMP (v1) to SNMPv3 on their networks. Second, the
multiplication of management interfaces on a single device has
opened many vulnerable channels. As an illustration, while the
CLI interface of a large campus switch was secured, it took
us three minutes to get full control of the device simply by
changing the accounts on the device over SNMP which was
left open. This is often the case with other devices today like
printers and their web-based management interfaces.
Recent work in our group has led to the design of generic
management plane level security and we have designed several
mapping approaches that enable to maintain a consistent
security policy on various management channels (Netconf,
CLI and SNMPv3) over many devices [20]. While this work
is promising, it does not yet include all possible management
interfaces (e.g. Web-based interfaces, Web-services specific
interfaces, ...) and would need standardization support for
the definition and maintenance of policies and technology
interfaces. This is unlikely to happen very soon leaving the
management plane unsecured still for a long time.
B. Secure worm based configuration
Although from the early years of Internet and its worms,
authors of malware considered that a secure configuration
management lifecycle has to be an essential and integrated
building block. Among the different existing approaches the
most illustrative case is the Hybris virus ([9], [21]). As it is
illustrated in figure 5, an advanced cryptographic authentifyis
used to autentify the manager and assure the integrity and
confidentiality of the software updates. The authors of this
virus wanted to guarantee that only legitimate updates can be
deployed via a public medium (news server) and the contents
of these updates remains accessible only to the infected and
controlled agents.
The underlying idea is very simple and elegant. The updates
can be checked for integrity using a public key based crypto-
graphy. A shared symmetric encryption key is computed from
the code of the virus and used to decrypt the contents of these
updates. The large number of different updates that emerged
in the following years shows that both from a conceptual and
operational aspect this design was sound.
Even though a secure life cycle management represents only
a subset of service management it’s worth to notice that using
well established cryptographic protocols and a simple key
distribution mechanism are the necessary ingredients for a well
secured service management plane. A more extended approach
should address a broader scope of management functionalities
including service monitoring and configuration as well as more
network level related operations.
VII. TOWARDS A WORM BASED MANAGEMENT PLANE : A
CASE STUDY
In this section we will illustrate a simple case study for
worm based management.
The Internet as of today is becoming the virtual playground
of a more and more younger user category, but is unfortunately
also the working environment of criminal predators, among
which a major category is associated to crimes and abuses
against children. A safer Internet can be made by keeping the
predators away from a vulnerable user population. Technically
this can be done by a sort of black list, where IP addresses
from this list are not allowed to connect to virtual chat rooms,
Fig. 5. Secure Configuration life cycle
direct communication or blogs used by young Internet users.
The key information required to configure such a blacklist
are the IP addresses of potential predators. These predators
are involved in trading/exchanging illegal files (in most cases
multimedia files which are illegal and violate any moral and le-
gal law) using multiple types of overlay distribution networks.
Such users can use a large variety of client software, ranging
from the well known P2P clients (emule, edonkey, dc++)
and up to the more efficient bittorrent or IRC networks. One
solution towards the identification of such a user category is a
large scale distributed overlay honeypot. The major objective
of such a honeypot would be to advertise the availability of
such illegal content and identify the clients trying to download
it. Although some false positives might be possible, it is
reasonable to assume that one IP address that is frequently
trying to download such content can be safely assumed to
harbor a predator. From an operational perspective, obviously
no real content will be distributed over the network. Rogue
data will be advertised and clients trying to download the data
will be logged and put forever on a download waiting list. Our
main working assumptions are the following :
1) A large population of users will deploy the client side of
the honeypot. Many well intentioned users will want to
help and participate in this collective hunt of predators.
2) Malicious users will install the honeypot and tamper
with it in order to identify and attack the management
plane.
3) The operations of the honeypot should be highly secure
in a potential hostile environment, while still being
transparent to well intentioned users.
Why do we require a worm based management framework
for such a purpose ? If we assume that a very large category
of users particpate in this hunting effort, then we will have
to address the management of a set of devices and services
having the major features :
– Large scale distributed management. For a large popula-
tion of users taking part in such a honeypot, we will have
to manage the individual honeypots. This management
must assure at least the configuration (list of file names
to be advertised) as well as the monitoring (requesting the
logs of IP addresses having tried to download a particular
file).
– Secure update and configuration. The management must
be done in full security. The minimal requirements are
to authenticate the manager and securely retrieve the
information about the clients having tried to upload a
given file.
– Provide to the client deploying the honeypot the infor-
mation about the advertised file names (if requested by
the client) while still assuring that no tampering from the
latter is possible. This can be done using cryptographic
mechanisms that are similar to the ones encountered in
the case of the Hybris virus.
– Preserve the anonymous identity of the management
plane. If one honeypot is to be deployed by a malicious
user, he should not be able to identify where the manage-
ment operations are initiated from. For this case, publish
subscribe communication paradigms and onion routing
mechanisms similar to the ones used by the Slapper worm
or the IRC based worms are the only viable solution.
Fig. 6. Worm based management : a case study
The described architecture (see figure 6) is under current
development in our group and an open source implementation
will be released in the very short future.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Valuable lessons can be learned from worms and current
malware. Even though the authors of malware are driven by
less honorable intentions, from a technical point of view they
successfully managed to overcome some major technical chal-
lenges. We argue in this paper that similar technical solutions
must become essential components for current network and
service management frameworks. Addressing in a cost efficient
way the management of large scale infrastructures with the
current traditional approaches is no more viable. On the other
hand, Internet worms are solid proofs that large scale device
management is possible with relative low costs in highly
hostile environments. Firewalls, network intrusion detectors
as well as system and network managers are the hostile
environments, in which worms and malware are capable to
propagate and exist. The rigid and well established manager
agent interaction based on standardized information models
and management protocols requires a major shift towards a
lightly coupled, epidemiologic management architecture. In
order to meet these goals, two paths are possible. The first
path is highly radical and assumes to start with a complete
clean slate for network management grounded on worm based
behavioral features. The second path is more smooth and
transitional, where existing management frameworks will gra-
dually include such features. Only time will show which is the
right path to go, but in order to succeed major future research
and technological challenges must be faced by the network
management community.
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